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Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core

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  • Okada, Akira

Abstract

We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137] so that an informed agent proposes an allocation, we define a notion of the informational core. A coalition has an informational objection to the status-quo allocation if and only if there exists an equilibrium rejection in the coalitional voting game. We present a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game in which coalitional voting games are repeated, and prove that a refinement of a sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game necessarily yields an allocation in the informational core.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2009-16.

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Length: 37 p.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2009-16

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Keywords: core; exchange economy; incomplete information; information transmission; non-cooperative bargaining;

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References

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  3. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
  1. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1340009-1-1.
  2. OKADA, Akira, 2013. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types," Discussion Papers 2013-15, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

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