Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies

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Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies

Author Info

Yusuke Kamishiro (Brown University)
Roberto Serrano (Brown University & IMDEA, Madrid)

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Roberto Serrano

Abstract

We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized mediated core concepts. We consider independent replicas of the basic economy: independent copies of the economy in which each individual\'s utility only depends on the information of the individuals who belong to the same copy. We provide an example in which core convergence does not obtain for the Dutta-Vohra credible core and for Myerson\'s randomized mediated core. On the other hand, we establish a positive convergence result for a refinement of Myerson\'s core for which information disseminates across coalitions within a given random blocking mechanism. Under some conditions, this core converges to the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian allocations.

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Paper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2008-01.

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Date of creation: 06 Feb 2008
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Handle: RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2008-01

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Paper
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2008-5, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-02-09 (All new papers)
NEP-CTA-2008-02-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
NEP-GTH-2008-02-09 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
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Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2005. "Two remarks on the inner core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 143-154, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1273-92, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers 0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
- Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 519, Econometric Society.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 260-285, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roger Myerson, 2004. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 659, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies," Papers 34-99, Tel Aviv.
Other versions:
- F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli, 1999. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," THEMA Working Papers 99-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 96-106, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 011, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 99-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2000. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0141, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Forges, F. & Mertens, J.-F. & Vohra, R., 2001. "The Ex Ante incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Papers 0101, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.

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