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Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

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  • Myerson, Roger B.

Abstract

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 136 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 260-285

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:260-285

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Cited by:
  1. Askoura, Y. & Sbihi, M. & Tikobaini, H., 2013. "The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 157-162.
  2. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May.
  3. Forges, Françoise & Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4100, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  5. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  6. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems," Working Papers 2011-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  7. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise.
  8. Youcef Askoura & Mohammed Sbihi & Hamid Tikobaini, 2013. "The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty," Post-Print hal-00924267, HAL.
  9. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-41, November.
  10. Clemens Löffler & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2013. "The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 219-239, February.

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