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Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Myerson, Roger B.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 136 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 260-285
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:260-285Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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