Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra [4] and the core proposed by Myerson [11] as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4JKRWK5-1/2/400ca93cfbbe48b85bdcd35283c7111a
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 134 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 117-137

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:117-137

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-97, November.
   
   • Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
2. Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
   
   • Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
3. Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September.
   
   • Oscar Volij & Darin Lee, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Game Theory and Information 9706002, EconWPA.
   • Volij, Oscar & Lee, Darin, 2000. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Staff General Research Papers 5193, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
   • Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory 005, Oscar Volij.
4. Volij, Oscar, 2000. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers 5140, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
5. Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 260-285, September.
   
   • Roger Myerson, 2004. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 659, Econometric Society.
6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
   
   • Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
7. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
   
   • Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
   • Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics.
8. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
9. Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 96-106, February.
10. Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Working Papers 731, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    
    • Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
    • Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Papers of Peter Cramton 95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
11. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
    
    • FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
12. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2005. "Two remarks on the inner core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 143-154, February.
    
    • DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, 2002. "Two remarks on the inner core," CORE Discussion Papers 2002001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
13. Oscar Volij, 1998. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 006, Oscar Volij, revised 15 Sep 1999.
14. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
    
    • Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
15. Forges, Françoise & Mertens, Jean-François & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/5454, Université Paris-Dauphine.
    
    • Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
    • Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • FORGES, Françoise & MERTENS, Jean-François & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," CORE Discussion Papers 2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
16. Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    
    • Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
17. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
18. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
19. Oscar Volij, 2000. "Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 63-79.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:

1. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
   
   • Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
   • Roberto Serrano & Yusuke Kamishiro, 2009. "Equilibrium Blocking In Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers wp2009_0911, CEMFI.
2. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
   
   • Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
3. Kamishiro, Yusuke, 2011. "Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 513-520, March.
4. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems," Working Papers 2011-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
   
   • Francoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," Working Papers 2011-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
5. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2008-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
   
   • Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
6. Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Oct 2012.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:117-137

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal