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Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

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Author Info
Roger Myerson

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Abstract

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 659.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:659

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Related research
Keywords: core; incomplete information; virtual utility;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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  1. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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