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Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies

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Yusuke Kamishiro
Roberto Serrano

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Abstract

We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized mediated core concepts. We consider independent replicas of the basic economy: independent copies of the economy in which each individual’s utility only depends on the information of the individuals who belong to the same copy. We provide an example in which core convergence does not obtain for the Dutta-Vohra credible core and for Myerson’s randomized mediated core. On the other hand, we establish a positive convergence result for a refinement of Myerson’s core for which information disseminates across coalitions within a given random blocking mechanism. Under some conditions, this core converges to the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian allocations.

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008-5.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-5

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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Keywords: Core Convergence Information Transmission Coalitional Voting Mechanisms Mediation Rational Expectations Equilibrium

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  1. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1273-92, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 260-285, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Kreps, David M., 1977. "A note on "fulfilled expectations" equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-43, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 96-106, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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