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Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information

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Myerson, Roger B

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 52 (1984)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 461-87
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:52:y:1984:i:2:p:461-87

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
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  2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1983. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 582, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory," Discussion Papers 907, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Elazar Berkovitch, 1985. "Reputation Effect in Equilibrium Search and Bargaining- A Stigma Theory of Unemployment Duration," Discussion Papers 668, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-29, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1987. "Bilateral Trade With The Sealed Bid K-Double Action: Existence And Efficiency," Discussion Papers 723R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Jean-Charles Rochet, 1988. "Théorie de la négociation : une sélection de quelques résultats récents," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 12, pages 01, Octobre-D. [Downloadable!]
  13. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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