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Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems

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This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2011-15.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-15

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1982. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation," Discussion Papers 527, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
  3. Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  5. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  7. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-97, November.
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers 0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  10. Okada, Akira, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-16, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  11. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 011, Oscar Volij.
  12. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  13. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2010. "Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 7-33, 03.
  14. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954, September.
  15. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  16. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
  17. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2005. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-82, October.
  18. DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, . "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1733, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  19. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 527-535, December.
  20. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  21. Roger Myerson, 2004. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 659, Econometric Society.
  22. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
  23. Omer Biran & Francoise Forges, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values," CESifo Working Paper Series 3067, CESifo Group Munich.
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