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Two-person bargaining with verifiable information

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  • de Clippel, Geoffroy
  • Minelli, Enrico

Abstract

We study Myerson's incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of verifiable types. For the case of an informed principal, in which one individual has all the bargaining power, we provide exact characterizations both from the non cooperative and from the cooperative perspective. We then show that the axiomatic characterization can be extended to the case in which both individuals have some bargaining power. Myerson's approach also suggests a new definition of the core that refines Wilson's coarse core. We argue that this refinement captures an important aspect of negotiation at the interim stage.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (2004)
Issue (Month): 7 (November)
Pages: 799-813

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:40:y:2004:i:7:p:799-813

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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References

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  1. Roy Radner, 1997. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1594, David K. Levine.
  2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
  3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  4. Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-78, May.
  5. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May.
  6. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1986. "Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 691, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  9. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  10. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Roger B. Myerson, 1982. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 527, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Geoffroy de Clippel & David Perez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. OKADA, Akira, 2013. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University 2013-15, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Adam Kalai & Ehud Kalai, 2011. "Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1512, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 1686, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
  7. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales 2011-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  8. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  9. Thomas Tröger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse21_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  10. Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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