Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
AbstractIn this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to "threats." We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies, the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable. (JEL: C70, C71, C78, D70) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 8 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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- Zhigang Cao, 2011. "Remarks on Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Discussion Paper Series dp565, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Francoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011.
"Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems,"
2011-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems," Working Papers 2011-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Forges, Françoise & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/8158, Paris Dauphine University.
- Cao, Zhigang, 2013. "Equilibrium computation of the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 152-162.
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