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Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats

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  • Zhigang Cao

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    Abstract

    The Hart-and-Mas-Colell bargaining model (Hart and Mas-Colell in J Eur Econ Assoc 8:7–33, 2010 ), which is based on strategic form games, is a very promising model possessing many beautiful features. Nevertheless, it is not flawless: threats used in this model may behave quite counter-intuitive, and the expected payoffs may not be consistent with the min-max solution in two-person-zero-sum games. If we postpone realizations of all threats to the end of the game, the two problems can be solved simultaneously. This is exactly the 2(a) model suggested by Hart and Mas-Colell in the last section of their paper. I prove that the new model can guarantee the existence of an SP equilibrium in the two player case. For the three-or-more-player case, unfortunately, it is shown through a counter-example that SP equilibrium may not exist. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 41 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 337-358

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:337-358

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    1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2010. "Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 7-33, 03.
    2. Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean Francois, 1996. "Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 279-302, February.
    3. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
    4. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    6. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "Adaptive Heuristics," Discussion Paper Series dp372, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    7. Sergiu Hart, 2003. "A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values," Discussion Paper Series dp338, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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