Cooperative Games in Strategic Form
AbstractIn this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to "threats." We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp484.
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010), 1, 7-33
Other versions of this item:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative Games in Strategic Form," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002406, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative games in strategic form," Economics Working Papers 1094, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-08-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2008-08-06 (Microeconomics)
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