Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria

Author Info

Hart, S.
Mas-Colell, A.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Sergiu Hart

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 9.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:9

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 200 Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/journals/hier
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: competition;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 74-99, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Game Theory and Information 9705003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Economics Working Papers 241, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
- Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-228, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Emilio Calvo, 2008. "Random marginal and random removal values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 533-563, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Calvo, Emilio, 2006. "Random Marginal and Random Removal values," MPRA Paper 142, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative games in Strategic Form," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002205, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative Games in Strategic Form," Economics Working Papers 1094, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative Games in Strategic Form," Discussion Paper Series dp484, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative Games in Strategic Form," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002406, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.