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Cooperative Games in Strategic Form

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  • Sergiu Hart
  • Andreu Mas-Colell

Abstract

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000002406.

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Date of creation: 12 Oct 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002406

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  1. Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Marginal Contributions And Externalities In The Value," Economics Working Papers we057339, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 74-99, March.
  4. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April.
  5. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  6. Herbert E. Scarf, 1970. "On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a General Class of N-Person Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 293, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  8. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2007. "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 339-356, July.
  9. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
  10. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  12. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
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