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A comparison of non-transferable utility values

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  • Sergiu Hart

Abstract

Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0040-5833/contents
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 56 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2_2 (02)
Pages: 35-46

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:2_2:p:35-46

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

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References

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  1. Geoffroy de Clippel & Hans Peters & Horst Zank, 2004. "Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, January.
  2. Sergiu Hart, 2003. "An Axiomatization of the Consistent Non-Transferable Utility Value," Discussion Paper Series dp337, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Zhigang Cao, 2013. "Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 337-358, July.
  2. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2010. "The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 137-150, March.
  3. Zhigang Cao, 2011. "Remarks on Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Discussion Paper Series dp565, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  4. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002205, David K. Levine.
  5. Lejano, Raul P., 2011. "A note on solution concepts for nontransferable utility games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 777-780.
  6. Chaowen Yu, 2013. "A Comparison of NTU values on a Certain Class of Games," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2012-041, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
  7. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 46-52, January.

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