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Noncooperative models of bargaining

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

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Author Info
Binmore, Ken
Osborne, Martin J.
Rubinstein, Ariel

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This chapter was published in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, , chapter 07, pages 179-225, 1992.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 1-07.

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This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 1992. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

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  1. Damme, E. van, 1995. "Game Theory : The Next Stage," Discussion Paper 73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. R. Bernardini Papalia & S. Bertarelli, 1998. "An Optimal Partnership Search Model: Theoretical Implications for the Europartenariat Event," Working Papers 310, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luis Eduardo Sandoval, 2008. "La Regulación De Los Cargos De Interconexión En Telefonía Fija Para Colombia Y Sus Perspectivas Con El Tratado De Libre Comercio," Documentos de Trabajo - Escuela de Economía 004683, UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA - RCE. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative games in Strategic Form," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002205, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Herrero & C., 2004. "On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 166, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Bargaining theory without tears," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 18(3), pages 403-419, September. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008. "On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Carmen Herrero Blanco & Giovanni Ponti, 2003. "An Experiment On Bankruptcy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  10. Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," Papers of Peter Cramton 92aer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2003. "International agreements on product standards: an incomplete-contracting theory," Working Papers 229, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Alessandro Innocenti, 2005. "Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry," Department of Economics University of Siena 468, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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