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Evolutionarily Stable Correlation

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  • Kam-Chau Wong
  • Chongmin Kim
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    Abstract

    Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introduces the analogue of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new notion of evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC) and prove that it generalizes ESS. We also study analogues of perfection (cf. Dhillon and Mertens (1994)), properness, and replicator dynamics for the correlation equilibrium and discuss their relationships with ESC

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    File URL: http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.16804.1077678412.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number 495.

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    Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:495

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    Keywords: Correlated Equilibrium; Evolutionarily Stable Correlation; Evolutionarily Stable State; Random Device;

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    1. DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1992. "Perfect correlated equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1992039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    4. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
    5. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    6. Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997. "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 551-556.
    7. Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
    9. Ianni, Antonella, 2001. "Learning correlated equilibria in population games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 271-294, November.
    10. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
    11. Forges, F. & Peck, J., . "Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1140, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    12. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    13. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
    14. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," Discussion Papers 295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    15. Cripps, Martin, 1991. "Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 428-434, December.
    16. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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