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Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)

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Author Info
Avner Shaked (Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, GERMANY)
Larry Samuelson (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, USA)
George J. Mailath (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

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Abstract

This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 551-556
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:551-556

Note: Received: October 3, 1995; revised version February 21, 1996
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella, 1996. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-177, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Blume Lawrence E., 1995. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 111-145, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kets, W., 2007. "Beliefs in Network Games (Replaced by CentER DP 2008-05)," Discussion Paper 2007-46, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stephen Morris, . ""Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching''," CARESS Working Papres 97-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lars Koch, 2008. "Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sanjeev Goyal, 2003. "Learning in Networks: a survey," Economics Discussion Papers 563, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  6. Susan Lee, 1999. "Assortative Interactions and Endogenous Stratification," Working Papers 99-08-056, Santa Fe Institute.
  7. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game," MPRA Paper 5475, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephen Morrs, . ""Contagion''," CARESS Working Papres 97-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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