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Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)

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Author Info

  • Avner Shaked

    (Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, GERMANY)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, USA)

  • George J. Mailath

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

Abstract

This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 551-556

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:551-556

Note: Received: October 3, 1995; revised version February 21, 1996
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References

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  1. Blume Lawrence E., 1995. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 111-145, November.
  2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
  3. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  4. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  5. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA.
  6. Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella, 1996. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-177, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Stephen Morrs, . ""Contagion''," CARESS Working Papres 97-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  2. Lenzo, Justin & Sarver, Todd, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 271-284, August.
  3. Lars Koch, 2008. "Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2007. "Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 179-197, November.
  5. Stephen Morris, 1997. "Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction, and Random Matching," Research in Economics 97-08-072e, Santa Fe Institute.
  6. Azrieli, Yaron, 2010. "Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 303-310, May.
  7. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society.
  8. Ianni, Antonella, 2001. "Learning correlated equilibria in population games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 271-294, November.
  9. Sanjeev Goyal, 2003. "Learning in Networks: a survey," Economics Discussion Papers 563, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  10. Susan Lee, 1999. "Assortative Interactions and Endogenous Stratification," Working Papers 99-08-056, Santa Fe Institute.
  11. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
  12. Kets, W., 2007. "Beliefs in Network Games (Replaced by CentER DP 2008-05)," Discussion Paper 2007-46, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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