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Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions

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  • George J. mailath
  • Larry Samuelson
  • Avner Shaked

Abstract

This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number 030.

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Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:030

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Keywords: ract: This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.;

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References

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  1. Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella, 1996. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-177, April.
  2. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9410003, EconWPA.
  4. L. Blume, 2010. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 488, David K. Levine.
  5. Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994.
  6. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Stephen Morris, . "Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department 1879bf5487d743edef7f32bb2, Penn Economics Department.
  2. Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78, January.
  3. Ianni, Antonella, 2001. "Learning correlated equilibria in population games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 271-294, November.
  4. Azrieli, Yaron, 2010. "Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 303-310, May.
  5. Kets, W., 2007. "Beliefs in Network Games (Replaced by CentER DP 2008-05)," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2007-46, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings, Econometric Society 495, Econometric Society.
  7. Susan Lee, 1999. "Assortative Interactions and Endogenous Stratification," Working Papers, Santa Fe Institute 99-08-056, Santa Fe Institute.
  8. Lars Koch, 2008. "Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse14_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Lenzo, Justin & Sarver, Todd, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 271-284, August.
  10. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
  11. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2007. "Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 179-197, November.
  12. Sanjeev Goyal, 2003. "Learning in Networks: a survey," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics 563, University of Essex, Department of Economics.

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