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Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction, and Random Matching

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Author Info
Stephen Morris

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Abstract

Incomplete information, local interaction, and random matching games all share a common structure. A type or player interacts with various subsets of the set of all types/players. A type/player's total payoff is additive in the payoffs from these various interactions. This paper describes a general class of interaction games and shows how each of these three classes of games can be understood as special cases. Techniques and results from the incomplete information literature are translated into this more general framework; as a by-product, it is possible to give a complete characterization of equilibria robust to incomplete information (in the sense of Kajii and Morris [1995]) in many player binary action coordination games. Only equilibria that are robust in this sense [1] can spread contagiously and [2] are uninvadable under best response dynamics in a local interaction system. A companion paper, Morris [1997], uses these techniques to characterize features of local interaction systems that allow contagion.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Research in Economics with number 97-08-072e.

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Date of creation: Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wop:safire:97-08-072e

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Related research
Keywords: Local interaction; game theory;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stephen Morris, . "Co-operation and Timing," Penn CARESS Working Papers b8d506ba7aa15345b602bb4eb, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, . "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions," CARESS Working Papres 97-6, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dean Corbae & John Duffy, 2003. "Experiments with Network Formation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000319, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ianni, A. & Corradi, V., 2000. "Ergodicity and Clustering in Opinion Formation," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0011, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Antoine Billot, 2007. "Social consistency and individual rationality," PSE Working Papers 2007-14, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  4. Robin Mason & Akos Valentinyi, 2003. "Independence, Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0303, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ulrich Horst & Jos´e A. Scheinkman, 2006. "A Limit Theorem for Systems of Social Interactions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000177, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Antoine Billot, 2007. "How to shake the Invisible Hand (when Robinson meets Friday)," PSE Working Papers 2007-13, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  7. Ianni, A. & Corradi, V., 2000. "Consensus, Contagion and Clustering in a Space-Time Model of Public Opinion Formation," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0009, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kets, W., 2008. "Beliefs in Network Games (Revised version of CentER DP 2007-46)," Discussion Paper 2008-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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