This paper discusses the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game, focusing on the structure of the matching process that describes how players meet. As in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1992), experimentation and myopia create 'evolutionary' forces that lead players to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium. To describe play with finite time horizons, it is necessary to consider the rates at which the dynamic systems converge. In large populations with uniform matching, play is determined largely by historical factors. When players interact with small sets of neighbors, evolutionary forces may determine the outcome. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 61 (1993) Issue (Month): 5 (September) Pages: 1047-71 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.