"Contagion''
Abstract
Each player in an infinite population interacts strategically with a finite subset of that population. Suppose each player's binary choice in each period is a best response to the population choices of the previous period. When can behaviour that is initially played by only a finite set of player spread to the whole population? This paper characterizes when such contagion is possible for arbitrary local interaction systems. Maximal contagion occurs when local interaction is sufficiently uniform and there is low neighbour growth, i.e. the number of players who can be reached in k steps does not grow exponentially in k. Copyright 2000 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Paper provided by University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences in its series CARESS Working Papres with number 97-01.Length:
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Handle: RePEc:wop:pennca:97-01
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- Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78, January.
- Stephen Morris, . "Contagion," Penn CARESS Working Papers ab67d13cfae3b5b56b7b9df3b, Penn Economics Department.
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