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On Local and Network Games

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Abstract

The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what constitutes a satisfactory solution concept.

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  • Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 2003. "On Local and Network Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1414, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1414
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shubik, Martin, 1996. "Why equilibrium? A note on the noncooperative equilibria of some matrix games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 537-539, May.
    2. Stephen Morris, 2000. "Contagion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78.
    3. Patrick T. Harker, 1986. "Alternative Models of Spatial Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(3), pages 410-425, June.
    4. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local games; Network games; Advertising;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • M39 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Other

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