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Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player

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Author Info
Fudenberg, Drew
Levine, David K

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Abstract

A single, long-run player plays a simultaneous-move stage game against a sequence of opponents who only play once, but observe all previous play. If there is a positive prior probability that the long-run player will always play the pure strategy he would most like to commit himself to (his Stackleberg strategy), then his payoff in any Nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the Stackleberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one. When the stage game is not simultaneous move, this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long-run player are observationally equivalent. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 57 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 759-78
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:57:y:1989:i:4:p:759-78

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M & Maskin, Eric S, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 555-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.

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