• NEP-ALL-2000-10-31 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2000-10-31 (Game Theory)
• NEP-LAB-2000-10-31 (Labour Economics)

1. Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
3. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
   Other versions:
   • D. Abreu & F. Gul, 1998. "Bargaining and Reputation," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s9, Economics Department, Princeton University.
7. Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
8. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Watson, Joel, 1996. "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 82-109, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
13. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
14. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 1986. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988. "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Watson Joel, 1994. "Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 260-285, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    Other versions:
    • Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
18. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 378-393, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    • D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
21. Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996. "Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 387-410, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Cripps,Martin & Scmidt,Klaus & Thomas,Jonathan, 1993. "Reputation in pertubed repeated games," Discussion Paper Serie A 410, University of Bonn, Germany.

Cited by:
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1. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
2. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]