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Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

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  • D. Fudenberg
  • D. K. Levine

Abstract

This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. The authors obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then, for generic payoffs, the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to one, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/impobs.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 571.

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Date of creation: 11 May 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:571

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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References

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  1. Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Scholarly Articles 3350444, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  3. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine.
  5. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
  6. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
  9. D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 1969. "Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 604, David K. Levine.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
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