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On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

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Author Info
Drew Fudenberg (UC Berkeley)
David M. Kreps (Stanford)
David K. Levine (UCLA)

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp398.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 398.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 1986
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:398

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," Discussion Papers 295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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