On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
AbstractThe philosophy of equilibrium refinements is that the analyst, if he knows things about the structure of the game, can reject some Nash equilibria as unreasonable. The word Ã¢â¬ÅknowÃ¢â¬ in the preceding sentence deserves special emphasis. If in a fixed game the analyst can reject a particular equilibrium outcome, but he cannot do so for games arbitrarily Ã¢â¬Åclose by,Ã¢â¬ then he may have second thoughts about rejecting the outcome. We consider several notions of distance between games, and we characterize their implications for the robustness of equilibrium refinements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 398.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1986
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Scholarly Articles 3350444, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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