Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Drew Fudenberg

Contents:

This is information that was supplied by Drew Fudenberg in registering through RePEc. If you are Drew Fudenberg , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Drew
Middle Name:
Last Name: Fudenberg
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pfu49

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage: http://fudenberg.fas.harvard.edu/
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Harvard University
Location: Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)
Homepage: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
Email:
Phone: 617-495-2144
Fax: 617-495-7730
Postal: Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
Handle: RePEc:edi:deharus (more details at EDIRC)

Lists

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations or Wikipedia entries:
  1. Drew Fudenberg in Wikipedia (English)
  2. Drew Fudenberg in Wikipedia (German)

Works

as in new window

Working papers

  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2013. "Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000685, David K. Levine.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012. "An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk," Working Papers 2012-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2011. "Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000001, David K. Levine.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps, 2010. "Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 218, David K. Levine.
  6. D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 546, David K. Levine.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2010. "Timing and Self-Control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 659843000000000008, David K. Levine.
  8. A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 425, David K. Levine.
  9. D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 2010. "Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 518, David K. Levine.
  10. Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word of Mouth Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 723, David K. Levine.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2010. "Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries," Working Papers 034, "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi.
  12. D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 2010. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 382, David K. Levine.
  13. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2010. "On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000312, David K. Levine.
  14. Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009. "Learning and Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 4382413, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David Gertler & Dreber, Anna & Ellingson, Tore & Nowak, Martin A., 2009. "Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation," Scholarly Articles 3804483, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  16. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2009. "Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000332, David K. Levine.
  17. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden, 2009. "Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem," NBER Working Papers 15167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Drew Fudenberg & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001695, David K. Levine.
  19. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2008. "A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 671757000000000010, David K. Levine.
  20. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2008. "Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002317, David K. Levine.
  21. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'," Levine's Working Paper Archive 671757000000000001, David K. Levine.
  22. Imhof, Lorens & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196338, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  23. Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin, 2008. "Winners Don't Punish," Scholarly Articles 2252594, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  24. Imhof, Lorens & Nowak, Martin & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?," Scholarly Articles 3200671, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  25. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
  26. Drew Fudenberg, 2007. "Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors," 2007 Meeting Papers 1031, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  27. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000002, David K. Levine.
  28. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, David K. Levine.
  29. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2007. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000815, UCLA Department of Economics.
  30. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
  31. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," 2006 Meeting Papers 680, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  32. Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics"," Scholarly Articles 3208222, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  33. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
  34. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2006. "An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000683, David K. Levine.
  35. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000526, UCLA Department of Economics.
  36. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000992, David K. Levine.
  37. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
  38. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
  39. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000731, David K. Levine.
  40. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000876, David K. Levine.
  42. Robert M. Anderson & Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2005. "Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2056, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  43. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
  44. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
  45. Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2004. "Imitation Processes with Small Mutations," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2050, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  46. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2034, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  47. Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Taylor, Christine & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  48. Drew Fudenberg & Markus M. Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2004. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2033, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  49. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," NBER Working Papers 9528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  50. Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg, 2002. "Competing Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1960, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  51. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2001. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7571, David K. Levine.
  52. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
  53. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 1999. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 81, David K. Levine.
  54. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1871, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  55. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine.
  56. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1873, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  57. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1999. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1870, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  58. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  59. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  60. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1998. "Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 603, David K. Levine.
  61. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1998. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 224, David K. Levine.
  62. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 471, David K. Levine.
  63. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1997. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games," Scholarly Articles 3160492, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  64. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1803, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  65. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 470, David K. Levine.
  66. Celentani, Marco & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4815, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  67. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
  68. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2059, David K. Levine.
  69. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  70. Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2015, David K. Levine.
  71. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 370, David K. Levine.
  72. Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  73. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
  74. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," IDEI Working Papers 34, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  75. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine.
  76. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
  77. Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  78. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," IDEI Working Papers 17, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  79. Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  80. Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  81. Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games," Working papers 590, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  82. Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1991. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction," Scholarly Articles 3190370, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  83. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
  84. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "Monopoly And Credibility In Asset Markets: An Example," Working papers 539, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  85. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "Equilibrium Payoffs Long-Run And Short-Run Players And Imperfect Public Information," Working papers 524, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  86. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  87. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine.
  88. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  89. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  90. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 221, David K. Levine.
  91. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales," Working papers 490, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  92. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note," Working papers 496, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  93. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents," Working papers 466, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  94. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games," Working papers 467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  95. Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, 1987. "Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships," Working papers 468, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  96. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 229, David K. Levine.
  97. Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  98. Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  99. Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1987. "NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7tr3c98t, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  100. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Working papers 445, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  101. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  102. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 220, David K. Levine.
  103. Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps., 1986. "Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants," Economics Working Papers 8602, University of California at Berkeley.
  104. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Predation Without Reputation," Working papers 377, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  105. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine.
  106. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers," Working papers 366, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  107. E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg, 1984. "The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information," Working papers 310, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  108. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud, 1984. "Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2205, David K. Levine.
  109. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine.
  110. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 242, UCLA Department of Economics.
  111. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1981. "Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 216, UCLA Department of Economics.
  112. D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 1969. "Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 604, David K. Levine.

Articles

  1. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2012. "Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 606-612.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2012. "Timing and Self‐Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 1-42, 01.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012. "On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 131-45, May.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David G. Rand & Anna Dreber, 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 720-49, April.
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
  9. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2011. "Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 34-68, August.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2010. "Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1673-1710, 09.
  12. Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2010. "Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 2-23, May.
  13. Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A., 2010. "Unobserved punishment supports cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 78-86, February.
  14. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2009. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 98-114, May.
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
  16. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Learning and Equilibrium," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 385-420, 05.
  17. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals-super-," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265, February.
  18. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2008. "Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 229-245, May.
  19. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 237, January.
  20. Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
  21. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
  22. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
  23. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
  24. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
  25. Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2007. "Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 550-567, March.
  26. Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
  27. David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1449-1476, December.
  28. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  29. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2006. "Imitation processes with small mutations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 251-262, November.
  30. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
  31. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief-Based Trade," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 42(126), pages 199-208.
  32. Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Word-of-mouth learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, January.
  33. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2004. "Learning to play Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 282-303, February.
  34. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Möbius, 2004. "Competing Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 30-66, 03.
  35. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife-Edge Or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1249-1278, November.
  36. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
  37. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January.
  38. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 2000. "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 634-657, Winter.
  39. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2000. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 253-272, Summer.
  40. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 2000. "Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 373-90, December.
  41. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 131-137, October.
  42. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
  43. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
  44. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 46-71, March.
  45. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  46. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 235-258, Summer.
  47. Drew Fudenberg & Dorothy Hodges, 1997. "Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 965-976, July.
  48. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1997. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 507-36, May.
  49. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125, February.
  50. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 75-93, February.
  51. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
  52. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
  53. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
  54. Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K., 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 103-135, February.
  55. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
  56. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
  57. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-43, August.
  58. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May.
  59. Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August.
  60. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 561-79, July.
  61. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
  62. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
  63. Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1991. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 218-19, February.
  64. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
  65. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
  66. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
  67. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M & Maskin, Eric S, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 555-73, October.
  68. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
  69. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-79, May.
  70. Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1990. "Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 194-206, June.
  71. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July.
  72. Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1989. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 606-19, June.
  73. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1988. "Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-18, February.
  74. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988. "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April.
  75. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-83, May.
  76. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 541-68, October.
  77. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 37-50, February.
  78. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  79. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit games and limit equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 261-279, April.
  80. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1986. "A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 366-376, Autumn.
  81. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July.
  82. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401, July.
  83. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May.
  84. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 522-530, Autumn.
  85. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December.
  86. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
  87. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April.
  88. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.

Chapters

  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327 Elsevier.

Books

  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, November.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, November.

NEP Fields

39 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2007-08-14 2012-09-30
  2. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (2) 2010-12-18 2010-12-18
  3. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (2) 2006-10-14 2007-08-14
  4. NEP-CMP: Computational Economics (1) 2006-10-14
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2009-07-28
  6. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (4) 2001-06-08 2001-09-26 2004-11-07 2008-08-14
  7. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2010-11-20
  8. NEP-GEO: Economic Geography (1) 2003-03-03
  9. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (13) 2001-08-21 2002-07-04 2002-07-04 2005-03-06 2006-03-18 2006-08-05 2006-10-07 2007-02-10 2007-04-09 2007-12-19 2008-11-11 2009-07-28 2012-03-14. Author is listed
  10. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (4) 2010-11-20 2010-12-18 2010-12-18 2010-12-18
  11. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2003-11-23
  12. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy (2) 2006-10-14 2007-04-09
  13. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (3) 2004-01-12 2010-12-18 2012-09-30
  14. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2010-12-18 2012-03-14 2012-08-23 2012-09-30
  15. NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (1) 2010-09-18
  16. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (1) 2007-08-14

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  9. Number of Citations
  10. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  18. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  19. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  20. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  21. h-index
  22. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  23. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  24. Number of Journal Pages
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  27. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  28. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  29. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  30. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  31. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  32. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  33. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  34. Closeness measure in co-authorship network
  35. Wu-Index

Most cited item

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Drew Fudenberg should log into the RePEc Author Service

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.