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Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Fudenberg, Drew
Mobius, Markus
Szeidl, Adam
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 133 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 550-567
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:550-567Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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