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Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information

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Author Info
Matthew O. Jackson
Leo K. Simon
Jeroen M. Swinkels
William R. Zame

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Abstract

This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie-breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best-response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie-breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy profiles satisfying the usual best-response criteria. It is shown that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence. Copyright The Econometric Society 2002.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 70 (2002)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1711-1740
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:5:p:1711-1740

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  1. Martin W Cripps & Jeroen M Swinkels, 2003. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000329, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2008. "Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 407-440, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2008. "Network Games," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/07, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2007. "Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars," Discussion Papers 0708-04, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Optimality And The Second-Price Auction With Resale," Discussion Papers 2004_03, York University, Department of Economics, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
  7. Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
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  8. Frank H. Page, Jr. & Paulo K. Monteiro, 2007. "Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting," Caepr Working Papers 2007-025, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gatti, J.R.J., 2005. "A Note on the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Discontinuous Payoffs," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0510, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  10. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro, 2006. "Pure Strategy Equilibria Of Single And Double Auctions With Interdependent Values," Economics Working Papers we065320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  11. McAdams, David, 2002. "Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working papers 4254-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  12. Cantillon, Estelle & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6083, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2004_2, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2006. "Non-Monotoniticies And The All-Pay Auction Tie-Breaking Rule," Economics Working Papers we065924, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  15. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2002. "On the Concentration of Allocations and Comparisons of Auctions in Large Economies," Working Papers 1146, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Aloisio Pessoa de Araújo & Luciano I. de Castro Filho & Humberto Luiz Ataide Moreira, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and Non-monotonic auctions," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  17. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers 1, York University, Department of Economics, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
  18. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004. "Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 300, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  19. Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 121473000000000021, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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