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Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions

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Author Info
Matthew O. Jackson
Jeroen M. Swinkels

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Abstract

We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade. The existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous Bayesian games. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00566.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 73 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 93-139
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:73:y:2005:i:1:p:93-139

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  1. Martin W Cripps & Jeroen M Swinkels, 2003. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000329, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ohad Kadan, 2004. "Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values," Working Papers 2004.12, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  4. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Large Market Design in Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-346, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2006. "Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility," Conference Papers 6630, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy. [Downloadable!]
  7. McAdams, David, 2002. "Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auction," Working papers 4249-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Christian Ewerhart & Nuno Cassola & Natacha Valla, 2006. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," Working Paper Series 668, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro, 2006. "Pure Strategy Equilibria Of Single And Double Auctions With Interdependent Values," Economics Working Papers we065320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  12. Michele Moretto & Cesare Dosi, 2007. "Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility," Working Papers 2007.3, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Large Auction Design in Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-282, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  14. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2003. "Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions," Economics Working Papers 0031, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2006. "Non-Monotoniticies And The All-Pay Auction Tie-Breaking Rule," Economics Working Papers we065924, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  16. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Efe Ok, 2004. "Multidimensional income taxation and electoral competition: an equilibrium analysis," Departmental Working Papers 200407, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and Non-monotonic auctions," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  18. Luciano I. de Castro, 2007. "Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions," Economics Working Papers we074622, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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