AbstractIn a self-confining equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and each player's beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play. Thus, if a self-confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly, no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs, even though beliefs about play at off-path information sets need not be correct. The authors characterize the ways in which self-confirming equilibria and Nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self-confirming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 2147.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1993
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