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Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria

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  • Fudenberg, Drew
  • Kreps, David M.

Abstract

A group of individuals repeatedly plays a fixed extensive-form game, using past play to forecast future actions. Each (asymptotically) maximizes his own immediate expected payoff, believing that others' play corresponds to the historical frequencies of past play. Because players observe only the path of play in each round, they may not learn how others act in parts of the game tree that are not reached infinitely often. Hence, differences and correlations in beliefs about out-of-equilibrium actions may persist indefinitely. The stable points of these learning processes are self-confirming equilibria, a weaker solution concept than Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 8 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 20-55

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:20-55

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
  5. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1993. "Subjective Games and Equilibria: I+," Discussion Papers 1077, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
  8. Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
  3. Joseph Greenberg, 2000. "The Right to Remain Silent," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 193-204, March.
  4. Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori, 2004. "Learning with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 304-324, February.
  5. Christoph March, 2011. "Adaptive social learning," PSE Working Papers halshs-00572528, HAL.
  6. Miettinen, Topi, 2009. "The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 162-164, November.

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