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Learning, Matching and Aggregation

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Author Info
Ed Hopkins

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Abstract

Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively di®erent from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic belongs to the same class of simply de

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Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number 033.

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Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:033

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Web page: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/economics/ELSE/
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Related research
Keywords: Games; Fictitious Play; Learning; Evolution.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Romeo, Charles & Sopher, Barry, 1999. "Learning and Decision Costs in One-Person Games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(4), pages 335-57, July-Aug.. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  3. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Paper Serie B 275, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  5. Tilman Borgers & Rajiv Sarin, 1993. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-47, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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  6. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Crawford, Vincent P., 1985. "Learning behavior and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 69-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  16. Canning, D., 1990. "Average Behaviour In Learning Models," Papers 156, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
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  17. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. repec:att:wimass:199410 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ted To, 1995. "Risk and Evolution," Microeconomics 9511003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2006. "An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000683, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, . "Price Dispersion: an Evolutionary Approach," ELSE working papers 043, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000547, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Takatoshi Tabuchi & Dao-Zhi Zeng, 2000. "Stability of Spatial Equilibrium," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-79, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Fernando Lozano & Jaime Lozano & Mario García, 2007. "An Artifitial Economy based on reinforcement learning and agent based modeling," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 003907, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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