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Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game

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  • Gale, John
  • Binmore, Kenneth G.
  • Samuelson, Larry
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    Abstract

    This paper studies interactive learning processes that are subject to constant perturbations or "noise." We argue that payoffs in the Ultimatum Game are such that responders are more apt to be "noisy" than are proposers and show that as a result the learning process readily leads to outcomes that are Nash equilibria but not subgame-perfect. We conclude that game theorists should not restrict attention to the subgame-perfect equilibrium when predicting laboratory behavior in the Ultimatum Game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982560580017X
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 8 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 56-90

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:56-90

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    1. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September.
    2. G. Bolton, 2010. "A comparative model of bargaining: theory and evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 263, David K. Levine.
    3. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    6. J. Ochs & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "An experimental study of sequential bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 331, David K. Levine.
    7. A. Cabrales, 2010. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 489, David K. Levine.
    8. Smith, Vernon L, 1976. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 274-79, May.
    9. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 753-70, November.
    10. Prasnikar, Vesna & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 865-88, August.
    11. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    12. repec:att:wimass:9324 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Miller, John H. & Andreoni, James, 1991. "Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 9-15, May.
    14. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
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