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Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics

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  • T. Borgers
  • R. Sarin

Abstract

This paper considers a version of Bush and Mosteller's stochastic learning theory in the context of games. We compare this model of learning to a model of biological evolution. The purpose is to investigate analogies between learning and evolution. We and that in the continuous time limit the biological model coincides with the deterministic, continuous time replicator process. We give conditions under which the same is true for the learning model. For the case that these conditions do not hold, we show that the replicator process continues to play an important role in characterising the continuous time limit of the learning model, but that a di�erent e�ect (\Probability Matching") enters as well.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 380.

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Date of creation: 08 Dec 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:380

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  2. A. Cabrales, 2010. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 489, David K. Levine.
  3. Schmalensee, Richard, 1975. "Alternative models of bandit selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 333-342, June.
  4. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
  5. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Symmetric Games," Working papers 90-24, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel, 2010. "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 432, David K. Levine.
  7. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
  8. Boylan Richard T., 1995. "Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 615-625, August.
  9. Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Paper Serie B 275, University of Bonn, Germany.
  10. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August.
  11. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "A model of random matching," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 185-197.
  12. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
  13. Boylan, Richard T., 1992. "Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-504, August.
  14. E. Akin & V. Losert, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics of zero-sum games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 424, David K. Levine.
  15. Cross, John G, 1973. "A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 239-66, May.
  16. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
  17. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
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