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Learning, Matching and Aggregation

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  • Ed Hopkins

    ()
    (The University of Edinburgh)

Abstract

Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic belongs to the same class of simply defined dynamic as do several formulations of evolutionary dynamics. We obtain sufficient conditions for convergence and divergence which are valid for the whole class of dynamics. These results are therefore robust to most specifications of adaptive behaviour.

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Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series Department of Economics with number 1996 : II.

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Handle: RePEc:edn:edecdp:9602

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  19. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
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