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Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications

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  • Jonathan Bendor
  • Piotr Swistak
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1005083323183
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

    Volume (Year): 45 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 99-159

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:2:p:99-159

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

    Related research

    Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionarily stable strategies; Evolutionary equilibria; Evolution of cooperation; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD); Tit For Tat (TFT);

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
    2. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    3. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
    4. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
    5. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic replicator dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
    7. A. Blume & Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 530, David K. Levine.
    8. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9410002, EconWPA.
    9. E. Dekel & S. Scotchmer, 2010. "On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 434, David K. Levine.
    10. Mailath, George J., 1992. "Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-277, August.
    11. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
    12. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    13. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
    14. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
    15. D. Fudenberg & C. Harris, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 496, David K. Levine.
    16. Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 485-507, June.
    17. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    18. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
    19. Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel, 2010. "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 432, David K. Levine.
    20. Selten,Reinhard, . "Evolution,learning and economic behaviour," Discussion Paper Serie B 132, University of Bonn, Germany.
    21. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    22. Banks, J.S. & Sundaram, R.K., 1989. "Repeated Games, Finite Automata, And Complexity," RCER Working Papers 183, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    23. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
    24. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312.
    25. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
    26. Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Viscous Population Equilibria," Discussion Papers 906, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    27. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    28. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
    29. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
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    Cited by:
    1. repec:dgr:uvatin:2007115 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. repec:dgr:uvatin:2006115 is not listed on IDEAS

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