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Repeated Games, Finite Automata, And Complexity

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Author Info
BANKS, J.S.
SUNDARAM, R.K.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 183.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:183

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: game theory ; economic equilibrium ; decision making;

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  1. Ran Spiegler, 2001. "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 0009, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining with an Asymmetric Breakdown Point," Working Papers 2005:38, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Damme, E. van, 1995. "Game Theory : The Next Stage," Discussion Paper 73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Guilherme Carmona, 2006. "A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 131-151, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0311005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ken Binmore & Michele Piccione & Larry Samuelson, . "Evolutionary Stability in Alternatin-Offers Bargaining Games," ELSE working papers 039, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Carmona, Guilherme, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp425, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ran Spiegler, 2003. "Simplicity of Beliefs and Delay Tactics in a Concession Game," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000208, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Games," Discussion Papers 1141, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, 1993. "A Bounded Rationality, Evolutionary Model for Behavior in Two Person Reciprocity Games," Game Theory and Information 9312003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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