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Stochastic replicator dynamics

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  • Antonio Cabrales

Abstract

This article studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks. I show that under these dynamics strategies that do not survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies are eliminated in the long run, even in the presence of nonvanishing perturbations, I also give an example that shows that the stochastic dynamics in this article have equilibrium selection properties that differ from other dynamics in the literature. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 54.

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Date of creation: Dec 1993
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:54

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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References

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  1. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  2. John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil, 1997. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1225, David K. Levine.
  3. Cabrales, Antonio & Sobel, Joel, . "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4186, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  4. repec:att:wimass:9122 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Giorgia Giovannetti & Albert Marcet & Ramon Marimon, 1993. "Growth, capital flows and enforcement constaints: The case of Africa," Economics Working Papers 22, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Ventura, Eva, 1994. "A note on measurement error and Euler equations : An alternative to log-linear approximations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 305-308.
  7. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
  8. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  9. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August.
  10. Massimo Motta & George Norman, 1993. "Does economic integration cause foreign direct investment?," Economics Working Papers 28, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  11. E. Dekel & S. Scotchmer, 2010. "On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 434, David K. Levine.
  12. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  13. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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