Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication

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Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication

Author Info

Blume, A. () (University of Iowa)
Kim, Y.G.
Sobel, J.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Joel Sobel

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 93-07.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:93-07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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Related research
Keywords: communication ; game theory;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 92-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andreas Blume & Yong-Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-29, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

Cited by:
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Andreas Blume, 1995. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9504002, EconWPA, revised 29 May 1996. [Downloadable!]
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Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim, 1994. "An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments," Game Theory and Information 9403006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2006. "Naive audience and communication bias," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 338., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Andreas Blume, 1993. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Game Theory and Information 9312002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, . "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
Georg Noldeke & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Learning to Signal in Markets," Game Theory and Information 9410001, EconWPA, revised 21 Oct 1994. [Downloadable!]
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David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Vidu,L., 1999. "The minimal quota for a complete and transitive majority relation," Working Papers 316, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
Andreas Blume, 1996. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9605004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result," Discussion Paper Serie B 298, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247. [Downloadable!]

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