Blume, Andreas () (University of Iowa) Dieckmann, Tone (National University of Ireland, Maynooth)
Abstract
We analyze simple adaptive learning processes to model the evolution of effective communication in cheap-talk games with initially meaningless signals. We suggest that learning rules may be sensitive to the information available to players at the population level. As a consequence, learning outcomes may depend on this information. We show that more information can be a barrier to comunication if new messages are introduced by mistake. If on the other hand the source of new messages is deliberate experimentation, then more information is not detrimental to communication.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
98-12.
Length: 30 Pages Date of creation: Nov 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:98-12
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 Phone: (319) 335-0829 Fax: (319) 335-1956 Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/ More information through EDIRC
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