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Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

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Author Info
Binmore, Ken
Samuelson, Larry
Young, Peyton

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Abstract

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 296-328
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:296-328

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Julian Arevalo, 2004. "Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda. A path-dependent model," Colombian Economic Journal, Academia Colombiana de Ciencias Economicas, Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Universidad de Antioquia, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad del Valle, Un, vol. 2(1), pages 189-212, November. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Julián Arévalo, 2004. "Negociación Nash Gradual con Agenda Endógena: Un Modelo Trayectoria-Dependiente," Game Theory and Information 0407001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Birendra K. Rai, 2006. "Evolution of Division Rules," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-27, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  4. Younghwan In, 2005. "A Fictitious-Play Model of Bargaining To Implement the Nash Solution," Departmental Working Papers wp0509, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-9-28.


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