This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number
9905002.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 27 May 1999Date of revision:
23 Mar 2000Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9905002Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word v2.5 (LaTeX); FirstContact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).
Keywords: games in extensive form ; games of perfect information ; backward induction equilibrium ; subgame-perfect equilibrium ; evolutionary dynamics ; evolutionary stability ; mutation ; selection ; population games ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995.
"The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction ,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
347, University of Bonn, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag, .
"The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction ,"
ELSE working papers
027, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
[Downloadable!] Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998.
"The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 260-285, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998.
"Learning in games ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997.
"Evolutionary Game Theory ,"
MIT Press Books ,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994.
"Game theory and evolutionary biology ,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications ,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, .
"An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction ,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
228, University of Bonn, Germany.
Other versions: Young, H Peyton, 1993.
"The Evolution of Conventions ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Francesco Squintani, 2004.
"Backward Induction and Model Deterioration ,"
Advances in Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1157-1157.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ziv Gorodeisky, 2003.
"Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations ,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp312, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
[Downloadable!]
Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009.
"A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS ,"
Working Papers
2009-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006.
"Superstition and Rational Learning ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Tomer Wexler, 2005.
"Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria ,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp402, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
[Downloadable!]
Ziv Gorodeisky, 2005.
"Stability of Mixed Equilibria ,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp397, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
[Downloadable!]
Herold, Florian, 2003.
"Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
40, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2002.
"The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games ,"
Economics Series
115, Institute for Advanced Studies.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2003.
"On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
03-098/1, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano & Rene Saran, 2007.
"The Evolution Of Bidding Behavior In Private-Values Auctions And Double Auctions ,"
Working Papers
wp2007_0712, CEMFI.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS was launched in September 1997.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .