References listed on IDEAS
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1. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
2. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-99, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996. [Downloadable!]
   • Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Hendon, Ebbe & Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Sloth, Birgitte, 1996. "Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 177-202, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, . "Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games," Discussion Papers 94-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Francesco Squintani, 2004. "Backward Induction and Model Deterioration," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1157-1157. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Francesco Squintani, 2001. "Backward Induction and Model Deterioration," RCER Working Papers 484, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
2. Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Joerg Oechssler, 1997. "Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect," Game Theory and Information 9702001, EconWPA, revised 15 May 1997. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2003. "Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • S. Huck & G. Kirchsteiger & J. Oechssler, . "Learning to Like What You Have -Explaining the Endowment Effect-," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1997-38, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
   • Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2005. "Learning to like what you have - explaining the endowment effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 689-702, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolotionary Dynamics," ELSE working papers 057, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 1997. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 221, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 6-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination Of Weakly Dominated Strategies And Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 6-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
4. Giovanni B. Ponti, . "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 16-97, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Giovanni Ponti, 1996. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Discussion Papers 96-22 ISSN 1350-6722, University College London, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Giovanni Ponti, . "Cycles Of Learning In The Centipede Game," ELSE working papers 024, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Agostino Manduchi, 1998. "Similar Actions and Cooperation in the Centipede Played by Automata," Working Papers 98-06-053, Santa Fe Institute.
6. Sergiu Hart, 1999. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction," Game Theory and Information 9905002, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hart, Sergiu, 2002. "Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-264, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2002. "The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games," Economics Series 115, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2004. "The simple geometry of perfect information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 315-338, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Steffen Huck & Joerg Oechssler, 1995. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Game Theory and Information 9507001, EconWPA, revised 27 Aug 1998. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • S. Huck & J. Oechssler, . "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach To Explaining Fair Allocations," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-13, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
   • Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. DEMICHELIS, Stefano & RITZBERGER, Klaus, 2000. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," CORE Discussion Papers 2000059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)