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Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games

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  • Cressman, R.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-3SX1KV4-1/2/7e79d279ae400b4ac42125272e24aa55
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

    Volume (Year): 34 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 1 (August)
    Pages: 1-19

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:34:y:1997:i:1:p:1-19

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    2. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
    3. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
    4. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
    5. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
    6. Balkenborg, Dieter & Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Population Games," Discussion Paper Serie B 314, University of Bonn, Germany.
    7. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
    8. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    9. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 392, David K. Levine.
    10. J. Hofbauer, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics for Bimatrix Games: A Hamiltonian system?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 440, David K. Levine.
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    Cited by:
    1. Cressman, R., 2000. "Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 183-205, August.
    2. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Giovanni Ponti, 1999. "- Continuous-Time Evolutionary Dynamics: Theory And Practice," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-31, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Dawid, Herbert, 1999. "On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 265-280, May.
    5. Sandholm, William H. & Tercieux, Olivier & Oyama, Daisuke, 0. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    6. Yasuhiro Shirata, 2012. "The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-21, February.
    7. Yuval Heller, 2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1857-63, June.
    8. Chamberland, Marc & Cressman, Ross, 2000. "An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 319-326, February.
    9. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Stability and trembles in extensive-form games," MPRA Paper 48160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Heller, Yuval, 2014. "Stability and trembles in extensive-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 132-136.
    11. Amann, Erwin & Yang, Chun-Lei, 1998. "Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-105, September.
    12. Antoci, Angelo & Sacco, Pier Luigi & Zarri, Luca, 2004. "Endogenous Preferences and Private Provision of Public Goods: a Double Critical Mass Model," AICCON Working Papers 2-2004, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.

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