Endogenous Preferences and Private Provision of Public Goods: a Double Critical Mass Model
AbstractIn this paper we set up an evolutionary game-theoretic model aimed at addressing the issue of local public good provision via direct commitment of voluntary forces (namely, private donors and nonprofit providers) only. Two classes of agents are assumed to strategically interact within a double critical mass model, where the provision and maintenance, on voluntary bases, of a public-type good is concerned. Uncertainty as to equilibrium outcomes emerges as within both categories a positive proportion of agents faces the temptation to opportunistically free ride on others efforts. Further, private donors and nonprofit providers payoff functions are interdependent, in the sense that (a) potential donors decide to be actual donors only insofar as a large enough proportion of nonprofit organizations provides a high effort level, otherwise they act as free riders; (b) nonprofit organizations, in turn, prefer to exert a high productive effort only insofar as a large enough proportion of potential donors acts as actual donors, otherwise they exert a low effort level. Through this analytical framework, we are able to focus on the critical factors affecting the dynamic outcome of such interaction: under certain conditions, in a medium-long run perspective, even in contexts where, initially, either a large proportion of agents behaves as free riders or a large proportion of nonprofit organizations exerts a low effort level, the local public good may be provided.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit in its series AICCON Working Papers with number 2-2004.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 05 Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Public Goods; Evolutionary Crowding-out; Voluntary Sector;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Angelo Antoci & Marcello Galeotti & Paolo Russu & Luca Zarri, 2005.
"Generalized Trust and Sustainable Coexistence between Socially Responsible Firms and Nonprofit Organizations,"
22/2005, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- Angelo Antoci & Marcello Galeotti & Paolo Russu & Zarri, 2005. "Generalized Trust and Sustainable Coexistence between Socially Responsible Firms and Non Profit Organizations," Working Papers 22, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paolo Venturi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.