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Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation

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  • Amann, Erwin
  • Yang, Chun-Lei
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-3V5MP6F-5/2/3a457e8503b4d87b88efc7dfedc161fc
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 37 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 1 (September)
    Pages: 91-105

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:37:y:1998:i:1:p:91-105

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    References

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    1. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
    2. Mailath, George J., 1992. "Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-277, August.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
    4. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    5. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, J├Ârgen W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players," Working Paper Series 375, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    6. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    7. D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 546, David K. Levine.
    8. Michi Kandori, 2010. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Levine's Working Paper Archive 630, David K. Levine.
    9. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, 03.
    10. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
    11. Cressman, R., 1997. "Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, August.
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    Cited by:
    1. Chun-Lei Yang & Ching-Syang Jack Yue & I-Tang Yu, 2007. "The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 3-20, March.
    2. Schnedler, Wendelin, 2003. "Traits, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics," IZA Discussion Papers 849, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Brosig, Jeannette, 2002. "Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 275-290, March.
    4. Berlemann, Michael, 2003. "The effect of signalling and beliefs on the voluntary provision of public goods," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 10/03, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:414-420 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Chun-Lei Yang & Jack Yue, 2010. "Assortative Matching, Information and Cooperation: An Experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 414-420.
    7. Chun Lei Yang & Ching Syang Jack Yue, 2004. "The Rise of Cooperation in Correlated Matching Prisoners Dilemma: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000097, UCLA Department of Economics.

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