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Correlation, Learning and the Robustness of Cooperation

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  • Nicola Dimitri

    (Universita di Siena)

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    Abstract

    In the stage game Prisoner's Dilemna one line of research which is pursued to justify the cooperative outcome is based upton some idea of correlation. This paper aims at testing whether correlation could support a cooperative behavior in the long run, by embedding the infinitely repeataed game within a simple evolutionary framework. In particular, the main theorem states that just two born cooperative agents might remain cooperative forever with strictly positive probability. This robustness result appears to be particularly strong since the model allows cooperative agents to switch strategy and start defecting from a certain time onward, but not vice versa. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.1999.0078
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

    Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 311-329

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    Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:311-329

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    1. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    2. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
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    6. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    9. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    10. D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 546, David K. Levine.
    11. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
    12. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    13. Zemel, Eitan, 1989. "Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-9, October.
    14. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
    15. Mailath, George J., 1992. "Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-277, August.
    16. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
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    Cited by:
    1. David K Levine & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2127, David K. Levine.
    2. Ren, Guangming & Wang, Xingyuan, 2014. "Robustness of cooperation in memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 408(C), pages 40-46.

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