Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
AbstractThis paper considers the repeated prisoner's dilemma in a large-population random-matching setting where players are unable to recognize their opponents. Despite the informational restrictions, cooperation is still a sequential equilibrium supported by 'contagious' punishments. The equilibrium does not require excessive patience and, contrary to previous thought, need not be extraordinarily fragile. It is robust to the introduction of small amounts of noise and remains nearly efficient. Extensions are discussed to models with heterogeneous rates of time preference and without public randomizations. Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 631.
Date of creation: 09 Dec 2010
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- Ellison, Glenn, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July.
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